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THE TYRRELL WILLIAMS MEMORIAL
LECTURE
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture was established in 1948 by the
family and friends of Tyrrell Williams, a distinguished member of the
faculty of the Washington University School of Law from 1913 to 1946.
Since its inception, the Lectureship has provided a forum for the discussion
of significant and often controversial issues currently before the legal com-
munity. Former Tyrrell Williams Lecturers include some of the nation's
foremost legal scholars, judges, public servants, and practicing attorneys.
The Honorable William J Brennan, Jr., distinguished jurist, public ser-
vant, and Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, delivered
the 1989 Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture on the campus of Washing-
ton University in St. Louis, Missouri.
THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION: SPORTING
EVENT OR QUEST FOR TRUTH? A
PROGRESS REPORT*
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.**
Twenty-six years ago this week I stood at this lectern to deliver the
fifteenth annual Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture.' It is an honor in-
* Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture given at Washington University School of Law on
March 8, 1989.
** Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States
I. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH.
U.L.Q. 279.
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deed to be invited to join you a second time in this tribute to an eminent
teacher and legal scholar. The subject of my lecture in 1963 was discov-
ery in criminal cases: whether we should extend to criminal prosecutions
the civil pretrial discovery techniques that force the parties to a civil law-
suit to put all their cards on the table before trial, and that tend to reduce
the chance that surprise or maneuver-rather than truth-may deter-
mine the outcome of the trial. A long tenure on the bench and the indul-
gence of kind hosts give me the opportunity upon occasion to revisit
views expressed in the past, and to see how my suggestions and predic-
tions have fared over the years. That is what I propose to do today. In
my experience, the results of such an exercise must be mixed. The last
quarter-century has seen significant advances in many areas of the law,
including criminal discovery. But as I said in 1963, "the quest for better
justice is a ceaseless quest," and "the single constant of our profession is
the need for continuous examination and reexamination of our premises
as to what law should do to achieve better justice."2 Law's evolution is
never done, and for every improvement made there is another reform
that is overdue. Hence the subtitle I have chosen for this lecture on
criminal discovery: A Progress Report.
The essential purpose of permitting a criminal defendant to engage in
pretrial discovery of the prosecution's case is to enhance the truth-finding
process so as to minimize the danger that an innocent defendant will be
convicted. Discovery serves other ends as well. The most important of
these subsidiary purposes, given courts' crowded criminal dockets, is that
a guilty defendant is more likely to plea-bargain and plead if the prosecu-
tion discloses to him a strong government case. This fact, as a practical
matter, is probably at the moment the main impetus to broad discovery
in the day-to-day workings of the criminal justice system. The prospect
of a plea is often enough to induce a prosecutor whose evidence is com-
pelling to open her files to the defense, even though no rule compels
open-file discovery. Nevertheless, discovery induced by the hope for a
plea is uncertain and arbitrary, because it depends solely on the prosecu-
tor's discretion and will be influenced by the strength of the prosecution's
evidence-so that voluntary discovery is unusual when the defendant
might benefit most from it, that is, where the government's case is weak.'
The proper guide to discovery practices should not be the likelihood that
disclosure in a particular case will save the trouble of a trial, as is now in
2. Id.
3. See Note, The Conundrum of Criminal Discovery, 64 KY. L.J. 800 (1976).
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large part the case, but the degree to which discovery will enhance the
reliability of factfinding. The central argument for broad criminal dis-
covery is the claim that the truth is more likely to come out at trial if
there has been an opportunity for the defense to investigate the evidence
and to prepare its case.
Defense counsel has only a very imperfect opportunity to test the gov-
ernment's case, for example, if she is unaware in advance that a prosecu-
tion witness has previously made statements implicating someone other
than the defendant in the crime; if she does not know that the witness has
been promised something by the government in return for testifying; or if
she has had no opportunity to interview the witness in advance of trial.
Similarly, counsel is likely to be unprepared to cross-examine an expert if
she has not seen the expert's written report. As a less obvious example,
consider that if the prosecution is permitted to surprise the defense by
seeking to introduce at trial evidence of the defendant's uncharged mis-
conduct to show, for instance, motive or intent, as the Federal Rules of
Evidence permit,4 then defense counsel will have only the most meager of
opportunities at that point to investigate the allegation of prior miscon-
duct or to formulate legal argument as to why the evidence should not be
admitted.
Going beyond these few examples, I would say as a general proposition
that the truth-finding function of criminal trial is enhanced when the
prosecution is not allowed to surprise the defendant with its evidence-
"trial by ambush" as it is sometimes accurately referred to-but is re-
quired to disclose its case in advance of trial so that defense counsel may
carefully consider and investigate the evidence and prepare her trial tac-
tics and questions. In this I agree with Justice Traynor who wrote, when
he was a member of the California Supreme Court, that "[t]he truth is
most likely to emerge when each side seeks to take the other by reason
rather than by surprise."5 As Justice Douglas noted in an opinion in
1958, instruments for obtaining broad discovery "make a trial less a
game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues
and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent," and it follows from
4. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). See generally Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All: No Right to
Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecution's Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247
(1987).
5. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228, 249
(1964).
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this view that "[o]nly strong public policies weigh against disclosure."
It is hardly contentious that the truth-seeking function of trial is
served by the exchange of information. But the extent to which "strong
public policies weigh against disclosure" has long been disputed. When I
gave this lecture in 1963 the prevailing view was still that there were
good reasons not to allow discovery in criminal cases. Let me give you a
brief outline of the state of criminal discovery at that time. The picture is
quite a bleak one, and it may surprise those of you who have studied
present-day criminal procedure, so rapid has been the transformation of
the law in this area. The lack of access at that time to materials essential
to the testing of the government's case and to the development of the
defense must surely have resulted in some unjust convictions. Indeed, it
may remind us of the historical inadequacies of criminal discovery in this
country that, according to Justice Jackson, Soviet prosecutors at the War
Crimes Trials at Nuremberg protested against adoption of American pro-
cedures on the ground that they were not fair to defendants.7
Twenty-six years ago a criminal defendant was entitled to very little in
the way of discovery of the prosecution's case or disclosure of informa-
tion in the government's hands relevant to his defense. The Supreme
Court had not at that time considered the question whether there is a
constitutional right to any sort of discovery, and in fact the constitutional
dimensions of criminal procedure in general had only recently begun to
be understood. Thus, it was not until a few days after my lecture here in
1963 that the Court decided the seminal case of Gideon v. Wainwright,'
holding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represen-
tation by counsel. It must be unthinkable to most of you in the audience
that a defendant had no right to counsel until so recently, but much of
constitutional criminal procedure is of similarly recent vintage.
The Supreme Court's major foray into the discovery area prior to my
first visit here had been our decision in Jencks v. United States9 that a
federal defendant is entitled to obtain the prior statement of a govern-
ment witness if the statement is related to the witness' trial testimony,
because of the singular importance of such statements to the defendant's
effort to impeach the government's witnesses. Despite confrontation
6. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
7. See Jackson, Some Problems Developing an International Legal System, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 147,
150-51 (1948).
8. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
9. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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clause overtones, the Jencks decision was based on the Court's supervi-
sory authority rather than upon the Constitution, 10 and Congress
promptly limited its potential effect on pretrial discovery by passing a
statute, the Jencks Act, 1 that prohibited disclosure of witness statements
until after the witness had testified on direct examination.12
Discovery under court rules was similarly little developed. In 1927,
Justice Cardozo had been able to identify only "the beginnings or at least
the glimmerings" of a "power in courts of criminal jurisdiction to compel
... discovery," 13 and although by 1963 the power to regulate discovery
was firmly entrenched, it had not been used to require broad disclosure
by the government. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which governs discovery to federal criminal defendants, at that time pro-
vided only that a district court might upon motion of the defendant order
the prosecutor to disclose certain documents or real evidence, provided
the defendant showed they might be material to the preparation of his
case. 4 The rules in some states, notably California, permitted broader
discovery, but in most states the defendant still had few rights in this
area. 15
Why was so little discovery required? The reasons for courts' and leg-
islators' reluctance to require the prosecution to show its hand prior to
trial received perhaps their fullest judicial airing in a case decided in 1953
when I sat on the New Jersey Supreme Court-State v. Tune. 6 In that
case, a narrow majority of the court held in a much-discussed opinion by
Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt that an accused was not entitled to dis-
covery of a copy of his own confession. That particular holding may
strike us today as startling,17 but in arriving at his conclusion Chief Jus-
tice Vanderbilt set out four arguments of much more general application
that remain even now the most powerful claims of those who oppose
broader criminal discovery, and on which the contemporary debate still
centers.
The first argument is that greater discovery leads not to more accurate
10. The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment might independently mandate the same
result, however. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 68 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11. Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (1957) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988)).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1988).
13. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 32, 156 N.E. 84, 86 (1927).
14. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, 18 U.S.C. app. pt. IV (1958).
15. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 283.
16. 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
17. This rule, of course, is no longer the law in New Jersey.
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factfinding but to an increase in perjured testimony by defendants or
their witnesses. According to Chief Justice Vanderbilt-and I quote
him-"in criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts
that often discovery will not lead to honest factfinding, but on the con-
trary to perjury and the suppression of evidence. Thus the criminal who
is aware of the whole case against him will often procure perjured testi-
mony in order to set up a false defense."18 His second argument was that
greater discovery leads to interference with witnesses, or with the state's
ability to procure them. He wrote, and again I quote, "that the criminal
defendant who is informed of the names of all of the State's witnesses
may take steps to bribe them or frighten them into giving perjured testi-
mony or into absenting themselves so that they are unavailable to testify.
Moreover, many witnesses, if they know that the defendant will have
knowledge of their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to come forward
with information during the investigation of the crime."19
The continuing influence of these two arguments is illustrated by the
fate of a 1974 proposal to amend Rule 16 of the Federal Rules to require
the prosecution to disclose before trial the identity and addresses of per-
sons it proposes to call as witnesses. The Justice Department opposed
the change, stating that the prospect of prosecutors having to disclose
witness lists was "dangerous and frightening in that government wit-
nesses and their families will even be more exposed than they are now to
threats, pressures, and physical harm."2 Congress deleted the provision
before passing the act amending the Federal Rules after Senator McClel-
lan, repeating exactly the arguments made by Chief Justice Vanderbilt,
predicted that disclosure of witness lists would allow defendants to tailor
their defenses to the government's evidence and to fabricate testimony,
and would result in witness intimidation.2" The Justice Department
maintains its opposition to witness-list disclosure today on these same
grounds,22 though I will talk later about why I believe its arguments lack
foundation and why, in any event, the standard arguments cannot re-
quire a general rule against the discovery of the identity of prosecution
witnesses.
18. 13 N.J. at 210, 98 A.2d at 884.
19. Id.
20. H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 674, 712, quoted in Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 268.
21. See 121 CONG. REC. 23,324 (1975).
22. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.103.
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The third reason given in State v. Tune for limited discovery was that
broad discovery would put the defendant in too favorable a position. An
accused's constitutional protection against self-incrimination places some
limits on what he may be required to disclose to the prosecution, and
there has been a feeling that it is somehow unfair to force the government
to disclose elements of its case when the defendant may hide his own and
surprise the government at trial. Chief Justice Vanderbilt thus wrote
that
the State is completely at the mercy of the defendant who can produce sur-
prise evidence at trial, can take the stand or not as he wishes, and generally
can introduce any sort of unforeseeable evidence he desires in his own de-
fense. To allow him to discover-the prosecutor's whole case against him
would be to make the prosecutor's task almost insurmountable.23
The classic statement of this view that discovery in criminal cases is a
one-way street and that this is unfair to the prosecution is Judge Learned
Hand's. He said:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest
outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his
silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the
minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have
the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and to make his
defense fairly or foully, I have never been able to see .... Our dangers do
not lie in too little tenderness to the accused .... What we need to fear is
the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and
defeats the prosecution of crime.24
The fifth amendment has not proved quite the barrier to reciprocal
discovery that Learned Hand envisaged, for modern discovery rules re-
quire that a defendant give the prosecution advance notice of some de-
fenses that may be particulary hard to deal with if they are sprung upon
the prosecution by surprise-notably alibi or insanity defenses.25 Never-
theless, this third argument is still commonly seen, for it remains true
that the privilege against self-incrimination prevents full discovery of a
defendant's case, so that, for example, if a rule were adopted permitting
depositions in criminal cases, it could not require the defendant to submit
to being deposed by the prosecutor or to answer interrogatories.
23. 13 N.J. at 211-12, 98 A.2d at 885.
24. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
25. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE SERIES § 19.4,
at 510 (1984).
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The final argument against broad discovery given in the Tune case was
really a response to claims often made by those calling for more liberal
disclosure. It was that the example of other countries-in which liberal
discovery has not been accompanied by the evils of perjury or witness
intimidation-hold important lessons for the United States. England, in
particular, has long allowed broad discovery, with no discernable ill ef-
fects. But, Chief Justice Vanderbilt argued, the English experience could
be no guide for America because the English are so much more law-
abiding as a people than we are.26
These arguments have not on the whole prevailed. In spite of them,
there has been a significant liberalization of criminal discovery. A com-
mentator even felt able to conclude a few years ago that "both the federal
and state systems today provide far greater discovery than was available
during the 1960 s. The winners of the discovery debate, except in a hand-
ful of states, have clearly been the proponents of liberal defense discov-
ery."2 7 I would not go so far as to claim such a complete victory, for it
seems to me, as I shall explain, that the four arguments made by oppo-
nents of liberal discovery in fact remain substantial barriers to the adop-
tion of a number of very important discovery principles. It is true,
however, that improvements have come, and on all fronts.
A very few months after my 1963 lecture, the Supreme Court began
the modem development of constitutional disclosure requirements with
our decision in Brady v. Maryland,28 which held that upon request a
prosecutor has a duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence-that is,
evidence that might affect the outcome of a trial. The precise contours of
the Brady rule have gone through considerable refinement in subsequent
cases. Although the existence of a constitutional disclosure requirement
is an important safeguard, the Brady rule has developed in such a way as
clearly to have very significant limitations when considered in light of a
defendant's discovery needs. The first is that disclosure under Brady is
limited to exculpatory evidence. The call for broader discovery in crimi-
nal cases, however, as commentators have pointed out, has "not focus[ed]
on the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, but on making available to the
26. 13 N.J. at 219, 98 A.2d at 889.
27. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 25, § 19.3, at 510.
28. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Others might date modem constitutional disclosure back to Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), which held that a prosecutor violates due process when she know-
ingly introduces perjured testimony.
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defendant a wide range of information collected by the prosecution. '29
A second and related limitation under Brady is that it is the prosecutor
who initially decides whether information in her hands is exculpatory so
that it must be disclosed. Thus the Supreme Court has held that
[i]n the typical case where a defendant makes .. .a general request for
exculpatory material under Brady . . ., it is the State that decides which
information must be disclosed. Unless defense counsel becomes aware that
other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's atten-
tion, the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. Defense counsel has no
constitutional right to conduct his own search of the State's files to argue
relevance. 30
If we assume that prosecutors are unlikely to search as long and hard
as would defense counsel for possible exculpatory arguments that might
be based on evidence in the prosecutor's files, then this reliance on the
prosecutor's decision as to what must be disclosed makes the Brady rule
of limited utility as a discovery device. In general, it is important to
remember that despite great strides forward in the constitutionalization
of criminal procedure, as yet, as the Court has said, "[tihere is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not
create one . . . ."'I It has been held, for example, that the Constitution
does not require disclosure of a confession,32 or of a witness' prior state-
ment.33 As things currently stand, therefore, federal and state rules,
rather than the Constitution, are the main source of discovery rights.
The Jencks Act continues to regulate a federal defendant's right to
discovery of prior statements by prosecution witnesses that relate to their
trial testimony, and to relieve the government of any obligation to dis-
close them before the witness has testified.3" But a federal defendant's
right to discovery under Federal Rule 16 has expanded since 1963. Rule
16 now provides that the prosecution upon request-but without any
need for the defendant to make a motion to the court-has a continuing
duty to disclose "any relevant written or recorded statements by the de-
fendant," the substance of oral statements by the defendant that it in-
tends to offer at trial, and the defendant's recorded grand jury testimony
29. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 25, § 19.3, at 482 (emphasis added).
30. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (citation omitted).
31. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
32. Cicenia v. Labay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
33. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
34. The Jencks Act is implemented by FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
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relating to the offense charged.35 It must also furnish the defendant with
a copy of his prior criminal record,36 and disclose documents or real evi-
dence obtained from the defendant or which the government plans to use
at trial, 37 and any reports made by experts material to preparation of the
defense or intended for use at trial.3" Reciprocally, a defendant who re-
quests disclosure of expert reports or documents and real evidence must
supply the government with any such evidence in the defense's files that
it intends to rely upon at trial.3 9 Upon motion, however, a court may
enter a protective order modifying the parties' Rule 16 obligations upon a
showing of good reason why the discovery should not take place.40
Other rules provide that the defendant must disclose in advance any alibi
defense,4" and allow depositions of witnesses upon court order for the
purpose of preserving evidence for trial, but not as a discovery device.42
Also of relevance to discovery is the provision that the government may
give pretrial notice of evidence it intends to use at trial that it believes
may be the object of a suppression motion.43 Finally, of great impor-
tance to the discovery process is the rule providing for pretrial confer-
ences, for these are often the vehicle of discussions and agreements about
the parties' discovery obligations, and facilitate the smooth operation of
the Rules.' Local federal court rules sometimes require broader discov-
ery of the prosecution than does Rule 16," though for reasons that es-
cape me the Justice Department opposes all such local
experimentation.46
Most states require at least as much discovery as the federal rules, and
some go a good deal farther. Fourteen states, for example, allow the
defendant access to prosecution witness statements as of right prior to
trial, and another eight permit such access at the court's discretion-
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B).
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
39. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
39. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1).
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
41. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1.
42. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1. See generally 2 C. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 291-93 (1982).
45. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. Cr., N.D. ILL., LOCAL CRIM. R. 2.04-a.l(f) (1988) (prosecutor to
disclose before trial "any evidence favorable to the defendant").
46. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, § 9-2.102.
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rules considerably more liberal than the Jencks Act.47 Others require
pretrial disclosure by the prosecution of relevant recorded statements not
just of its witnesses, but of any person.48 Many states require the prose-
cution to disclose in advance a list of persons it intends to call as wit-
nesses.49 And a few states permit discovery depositions, either as of right
or upon a showing of need." There have been important advances, then.
But they are spotty, and a number of states and the federal system lag far
behind.
The American Bar Association has produced a blueprint for criminal
discovery rules, which in my view states the bare minimum of discovery
that should be required. Insofar as Rule 16 and state rules require less,
they are deficient and detract from the truth-finding function of the trial
and deny the accused the fair trial to which he is entitled. The ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice recommend a general rule of "full and
free discovery,"51 under which the norm will be open disclosure of the
contents of the prosecutor's file.5" Under these standards, the prosecu-
tion would be required to disclose prior to trial "all of the material and
information" within its control, including witness lists, statements, and
grand jury testimony, and codefendant statements and criminal
records. 3 Adoption of this principle would be a very significant im-
provement upon the discovery practices of systems like the federal one,
under which disclosure of witness statements is delayed until too late,
witness lists are not discoverable, and information about codefendants is
not made available. The ABA Standards would also mandate that the
prosecution disclose expert reports made in connection with the case, not
just those it deems material to the defense or intends to use at trial. 4 In
addition, the prosecutor would be obliged to inform the defense if she
intends to perform scientific tests that would destroy evidence, or if she
intends to offer other-offense evidence at trial.5 To deal with exceptional
cases in which open-file discovery may be problematic, the standards
47. See Note, Defendant Access to Prosecution Witness Statements in Federal and State Crimi-
nal Cases, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 471, 501-02 (1983).
48. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 25, § 19.3, at 496.
49. See Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 269-70.
50. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 25, § 19.3, at 508-09.
51. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 11-1 (2d ed. 1980).
52. Id. § 11-2.1.
53. Id. § 11-2.1(a).
54. Id. § 1l-2.1(a)(iv). Cf FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
55. ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice § 11-2.1(b).
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provide that evidence may be withheld if it would identify a secret in-
formant or pose a grave risk to national security.56 Moreover, the gov-
ernment may upon a showing of good cause obtain a protective order for
other sorts of evidence that would otherwise have to be disclosed to de-
fense counsel. 57 The ABA drafters concluded that "experience with
broad discovery suggests ... that protective orders are an appropriate
method of coping with the occasional case in which pretrial disclosures
will jeopardize victims, witnesses, or evidence."5 "
The ABA Standards, if widely adopted by the states and incorporated
into the Federal Rules, would certainly improve a defendant's opportu-
nity to investigate evidence, to interview witnesses, and in general to pre-
pare for trial. But even the ABA Standards fall short in some respects of
the ideal of open discovery. Three other areas in which changes are es-
sential if discovery practices are fully to serve the interest in a fair trial in
which the truth is most likely to be determined come to mind. The first
is the prosecution's use of uncharged misconduct evidence for the pur-
poses permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Only pretrial dis-
closure of such evidence will allow the defense adequate opportunity to
investigate the claim of misconduct and to prepare objections to admis-
sion. The second is the current lack of discovery for the criminal records
of government witnesses, which is vital information for impeachment
purposes, so that prosecution suppression of this information improperly
interferes with the defendant's ability to cross-examine. 9 Third, the
general prohibition on taking depositions for discovery purposes is surely
due for reconsideration. Depositions have proved an important discov-
ery tool in civil cases, and when a defendant's freedom, rather than civil
liability, is at stake, we should enhance rather than limit the discovery
that is available. Neither witness statements nor an opportunity to cross-
examine at a preliminary hearing, when one is held, provide an adequate
substitute for a deposition. While depositions may be costly and time-
consuming-as Griffin Bell complained in his 1983 Tyrrell Williams lec-
ture6° -nevertheless this argues at best for the solution of granting courts
56. Id. § 11-2.6.
57. Id. § 11-4.4.
58. Id. § 11-4.4 commentary at 11.61.
59. When Congress overrode in 1974 a proposal that would have amended the Federal Rules so
as to require discovery of witness lists, it also struck down a proposal to give the defendant a right to
disclosure of the prosecution witnesses' criminal records. See 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 44, § 254, at
91.
60. Bell, Assuring the Adversary System, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 673, 678-79 (1983).
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discretion to order discovery depositions in an appropriate case, rather
than for the current practice of not allowing them at all.
Why do current federal and state rules go only part way in providing
for open discovery? Because the four arguments made by Chief Justice
Vanderbilt that I described earlier still have proponents, and have effec-
tively barred the further broadening of disclosure. Time and again the
opponents of more liberal criminal discovery conjure pictures of that old
hobgoblin perjury, and of witness intimidation; they suggest that further
discovery would be a one-way street, favoring the defendant at the ex-
pense of the government's ability to obtain convictions; and they assert
that England's experience with broad discovery has no application here.
I explained in my 1963 lecture why I thought that these arguments lack
merit. Now, twenty-six years of experience during which discovery has
become more readily available makes it considerably easier to assess the
merits of these arguments, and to conclude that they should be no barrier
to open-file disclosure and the other changes I have suggested.
Experience should certainly have persuaded doubters that improved
criminal discovery does not lead to more perjury. I know of no indica-
tion that the very extensive discovery long allowed in civil causes has
fostered perjury, nor of any signs that the changes of the last quarter-
century have encouraged perjury in criminal actions. On the contrary,
one would expect full information often to make perjury more difficult.
In any event, we should not allow the presumption in favor of full disclo-
sure, a strong policy deriving from the truth-finding function of the trial,
to be overborne by assertions about increased perjury that have never
been backed by any evidence, but appear to be based on mere hunches.
The mere possibility that a dishonest accused might abuse discovery,
Dean Wigmore wrote, "is no reason for committing the injustice of refus-
ing the honest accused a fair means of clearing himself. That argument is
outworn; it was the basis (and with equal logic) for the one-time refusal
of the criminal law ... to allow the accused to produce any witnesses at
all."'"
The argument that disclosure may lead to witness intimidation has
proved a major obstacle to discovery of witness lists which would enable
the defense to interview and investigate prosecution witnesses and which
are a prerequisite to the taking of depositions by the defense. It has also
stood in the way of pretrial disclosure of witness statements. I do not
61. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1863, at 488 (3d ed. 1940).
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deny that discovery may lead to the intimidation-or worse-of some
witnesses in some cases, or that it may dissuade some witnesses from
coming forward in the first place. We have all read of instances in which
informants who have agreed to testify, in particular against organized
crime, have been threatened or murdered, and the federal witness protec-
tion program is clearly a very costly and disruptive method of protecting
witnesses who may be in danger. But the proper response to the intimi-
dation problem cannot be to prevent discovery altogether; it is rather to
regulate discovery in those cases in which it is thought that witness in-
timidation is a real possibility. It is idle to suggest that we cannot tailor
discovery of witness lists and the like to particular cases. As one scholar
has put it, "there is a considerable difference between a tax evasion or
antitrust case and a case involving murder or organized crime, and be-
tween the ordinary indigent accused and the hardened professional crim-
inal."62 Federal Rule 16 and state rules already contain the answer to
the intimidation problem, providing that the government may seek a pro-
tective order. Rule 16 does not give the court much guidance in the
exercise of its discretion. Some state rules do better. Arizona's rule
states that a protective order should be issued only if the government
makes a showing that the disclosure would result in a risk of harm out-
weighing any usefulness of the disclosure.63 New Jersey's rule illustrates
what the court should take into account: "Protection of witnesses and
others from physical harm, threats of harm, bribes, economic reprisals
and other intimidation; maintenance of such secrecy regarding infor-
mants as is required for effective investigation of criminal activity; pro-
tection of confidential relationships and privileges recognized by law;
[and] any other relevant considerations."' There is no good reason why
broad discovery under these safeguards should not be adequate to deal
with any problem of Witness intimidation.
The third argument-that broad discovery would be a one-way street
because of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination-seems
these days almost frivolous, the product of an unthinking law-and-order
mentality that looks with intolerance upon any suggestion that the ac-
cused may have rights. It surely cannot be the result of rational analysis
of the respective positions of the defense and the prosecution. The prose-
62. 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 44, § 252, at 39.
63. ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.5.
64. N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:13-3(d)(1). On protective orders generally, see 2 W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 25, § 19.3, at 500-01.
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cution is already entitled to disclosure of an alibi or insanity defense, and
to reciprocal disclosure of expert reports and of real and documentary
evidence. Nor have the limits imposed by the fifth amendment really
been tested in the discovery area. Insofar as the Constitution does pre-
vent fully reciprocal discovery, this fact must be considered in light of the
many and manifest advantages enjoyed by the prosecutor as an arm of
government: the subpoena power, the grand jury, police powers of
search and seizure, and, of course, the investigative assistance of the po-
lice, and on the federal side of the FBI and a host of specialized investiga-
tors-not to mention the government's advantage in having a cadre of
talented, specialist lawyers.65 Discovery allows the defense to focus its
investigation, and thus offsets to some extent the enormous advantage
that the state otherwise has in terms of resources for investigating a
crime. Unsurprisingly, in light of the prosecutor's resources, studies
have suggested that defense disclosure to the prosecution is usually
unimportant.66
We should also look somewhat askance at the claim that the experi-
ence of other nations is of no application here because we are a less law-
abiding people. Whatever the merits of the factual claim, its relevance to
how we should structure discovery escapes me. Broad discovery makes
for a fair trial and enhances the likelihood that the truth will come out.
Fair trials that determine the truth are of no less importance in a nation
with a higher crime rate than elsewhere! I would hope that we are not
prepared to try to lower our crime rate by stacking the odds at trial
against the defendant, suppressing information that he needs to conduct
a defense. That net would catch the innocent as well as the guilty.
The level of discovery taken in other common-law countries to be nec-
essary for a fair trial surely is relevant for us, and in England substan-
tially more disclosure by the prosecution is required. The English
prosecutor must, in more serious cases, disclose any material in her files
that has some bearing on the offense charged or on the surrounding cir-
cumstances, whether or not she intends to use this evidence at trial.
Moreover, the prosecutor must disclose her case, handing over witness
statements and the like, or alternatively summaries of the facts and of
matters she intends to rely upon at trial. And she must give the defense
not just a witness list, but a list including names and addresses of all
65. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 25, § 19.4, at 510.
66. See, e.g., R. NIMMER, PROSECUTOR DISCLOSURE AND JUDICIAL REFORN 48 (1975).
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persons the prosecution has reason to believe may have material evi-
dence, whether or not they will be called at trial.6 7 Finally, the prosecu-
tion is required to disclose impeachment material on prosecution
witnesses. The court may limit discovery that could result in witness
intimidation, or would reveal the identity of an informant, so that the
balance between the needs of the defendant and the harms discovery
might cause is struck in the individual case, against the background of
rules that favor broad discovery. This is fair discovery indeed, and it has
not been accompanied by the collapse of the criminal justice system in
England, nor by a mass failure to get convictions because of increased
perjury or witness intimidation. This suggests, of course, that the argu-
ments raised in the United States against broad discovery-perjury, in-
timidation, and unfairness to the prosecution-are flawed.
There is little enough merit to the arguments that have stood in the
way of broad criminal discovery in this country that I cannot help but
feel that some of the reluctance to allow defendants more discovery de-
rives from a declining but still identifiable tendency to regard the crimi-
nal trial as being, as Glanville Williams put it, "in the nature of a game
or sporting contest," rather than as "a serious inquiry aiming to distin-
guish between guilt and innocence."68 Our adversary system of criminal
justice has invited many comparisons to sporting events-and generally
to the more barbarous among them. Jeremy Bentham likened a trial to a
foxhunt. 69 A more common comparison, however, is to a fight, a boxing
match-perhaps, as Jerome Frank suggested, because we recall that tri-
als had their origins "as substitutes for private out-of-court brawls.",71
To some observers, the criminal trial has resembled nothing so much as a
pugilistic contest between counsel for the government and for the ac-
cused, fought according to procedural and substantive rules aimed, like
the Marquis of Queensberry's, at ensuring a fair fight. The judge takes
an umpireal role, enforcing the rules, and the jury declares the winner.
67. On discovery in England, see generally J. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE
IN CRIMINAL CASES 328-33 (S. Mitchell & P. Richardson 42d ed. 1985); J. BALDWIN, PRE-TRIAL
JUSTICE (1985); ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, THE INVESTIGATION AND PROS-
ECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE 70-74
(1981); Baldwin & Mulvaney, Advance Disclosure in the Magistrates' Courts: Two Cheers for Section
48, 1987 CRIM. L. REV. 315.
68. Williams, Advance Notice of the Defense, 1959 CRIM. L. REV. 548, 554.
69. J. BENTHAM, Impropriety of the Exclusion Put Upon SeIf-Disserving Evidence by English
Law, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 454 (J. Bowring ed., 1843).
70. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80 (1949) (in
a chapter entitled "The 'Fight' Theory versus The 'Truth' Theory").
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Even the language in which we describe a criminal trial-the state versus
the accused-conjures up images of a contest. Other correlates come
readily to mind. The coaches sit behind the counsel table, ready to revive
a flagging participant with the legal equivalent of Gatorade-an apposite
citation, perhaps, or a suggestion as to the basis for an objection. Specta-
tors line up for the big fight and seats may be hard to come by. First in
line are the "buffs," the interested amateur spectators who, experienced
counsel will tell you, develop favorites among lawyers and follow their
trials closely and insightfully, supplying both encouragement and critical
comment. And of course, professional commentators abound, ready to
lambaste a lawyer's performance, or second guess the umpire's call.7 '
Metaphor certainly has its uses in bringing us to an understanding of
the various elements of the legal system. A metaphor may give more
depth to an insight than any amount of dry legal discourse. For example,
the ceremonial or dramatic elements of a trial-less pronounced here
than in England, but nevertheless plainly present-have caused trials to
be compared to theatrical events. This theatre metaphor certainly helps
in understanding that, in one of its aspects, a trial is a "dramatic enact-
ment" of a clash between individual action and community norms, one
that works at many different levels-as symbol, as parable, and even, as
the continuing glut of films and TV programs that have trials as their
centerpieces evidences, as entertainment. 72 The theatre metaphor is le-
gitimate, I think, because criminal trials are and are intended to be richly
symbolic and educational-that is part of their function in a society gov-
erned by the rule of law-and because their symbolic and educational
effects are made so powerful only because the human drama of the trial is
so engrossing and, if you like, entertaining.
The explanatory power of the theatre metaphor is only partial, for it
cannot encompass all the functions of the criminal trial. Most impor-
tant, it is a metaphor that illuminates only the external aspects of the
trial, not its internal function of truth-finding. It is a commonplace of
discourse among those studying the philosophy of punishment that the
internal and external functions of trial and punishment do not operate in
71. Professor Arthur Leff developed the "trial as sport" metaphor in his article, Leff, Law and,
87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978).
72. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel,
34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (1982). The theatrical metaphor is explored in Ball, The Play's the
Thing: An Unscientific Reflection On Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81
(1975).
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tandem. Most of the broader external or communal benefits of criminal
trials-the symbol that the rule of law is operating, the parable about the
bad man's lot, the deterrence of criminal activity, and so on-would be
equally well served by a "show trial" in which truth-finding played no
role.73 So long as we recognize this very substantial limitation, the thea-
tre metaphor seems to me to be quite helpful.
The dominant sports metaphor has a similar failing. Focusing on the
internal function of the criminal trial helps us to see why it is so mislead-
ing and dangerous to compare the criminal trial to a sporting contest.
The procedural rules that govern a criminal trial, including rules of dis-
covery, should serve the basic internal function of the trial-the determi-
nation of the truth. The rules that govern a sporting contest, on the
other hand, are designed to ensure that the person or team with the best
skills wins. That end is served by rules that put the participants in the
same position, that make them evenly matched in all things except their
own skills, which are thus put to the test. It is axiomatic, given the pur-
pose of the rules of sports, that all participants must be governed by the
same rules. This sporting conception of fairness-procedural equiva-
lence in the positions of the participants under the rules, so that skills
determine the outcome of the contest-simply has no place in a criminal
trial. There is no obvious reason why, within an adversary system of
justice, the truth should be most likely to come out if the two sides are
evenly matched and governed by the same rules. Rules of fairness in a
criminal trial must derive not from some effort evenly to match the
sides-the government and the accused-but from careful attention to
the trial's internal truth-finding function. Procedural rules ought to be
designed to maximize the chance that the outcome of the trial will be a
verdict that is based on what truly occurred, and it would be mere hap-
penstance if the set of rules thus derived bore any resemblance to a set of
rules that would ensure fairness in the sporting sense of fair play between
counsel-evenly matched legal gladiators. I have suggested today that
we could go further towards ensuring the fairness of criminal trials if we
adopted rules allowing for considerably more discovery to the defense
than is now permitted.
73. The internal and external functions of criminal trials are not, however, mutually exclusive.
One function of trial and punishment is specific deterrence-a function obviously served if a con-
victed defendant is incarcerated so he cannot sin again. This function has an external aspect, since it
keeps off the streets someone who might otherwise commit other crimes. A show trial fails to serve
this particular external function.
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